Emergent Global Land Governance by Margulis, Matias
  
 
EMERGENT GLOBAL LAND GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Matias E. Margulis* 
Division of History and Politics 
University of Stirling  
Email: m.e.margulis@stir.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Land governance is currently the focus of many new global rule-making projects, marking a sharp 
break with past practices that sought to exclude land as an international governance issue. Wide-
ranging concerns about land grabbing and its exclusionary and ecological consequences have driven 
this, prompting states and global civil society to devise new global land-governance instruments. 
This chapter offers a preliminary theoretical and empirical analysis of what is conceptualized as 
“emergent global land governance,” focusing primarily on its international governance dimensions. 
A review of relevant land-governance policy instruments in the fields of investment, land tenure, 
and forestry suggests that emergent global land governance is likely to consist of multiple, 
overlapping instruments with diverging normative frameworks and objectives that are not closely 
coordinated instead of a singular, discrete international regime. 
 
*This is an Accepted Manuscript of a chapter published in Karen C. Seto & Anette Reenberg (eds.), 
Rethinking Global Land Use in an Urban Era (Cambridge: MIT Press): 183-200. More information 
available at: https://mitpress.mit.edu/index.php?q=books/rethinking-global-land-use-urban-era 
  
 
 
 Introduction 
 
Land now occupies a significantly higher profile in global governance deliberations compared to 
past decades. The principle reason for this renewed interest in land and its governance at the global-
scale is the recent wave of large-scale acquisitions of agricultural land (itself part of the broader 
global phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’). Land governance is currently the subject of new global 
rule-making projects at international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture and 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and the Group of Eight (G-
8)/Group of Twenty (G-20), which are clubs of states with the largest economies. Ongoing work to 
establish global rules to regulate foreign investment in agricultural land is a major element of 
transnational advocacy by prominent international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such 
as Oxfam, and global social movements, such as the food sovereignty movement. Private actors too, 
including transnational agri-food corporations and institutional investors, have also expressed an 
interest in global rules to ensure their current and future investments in land are coherent with best 
practices on socially responsible and sustainable investment, as well as in order to minimize risk to 
their profits and reputation. These developments confirm a rising interest in and demand for global 
forms of land governance.  
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The current flurry of activity surrounding global rule-making for land makes a compelling case for 
greater scholarly analysis of new developments in land governance. In addition, land also provides 
an important case for the study of contemporary global governance practices given that land has 
hitherto been treated as a local/national policy issue rather than one of global concern. This chapter 
offers a preliminary theoretical discussion and empirical analysis of what can be described as 
emergent global land governance, that is, the set of norms, rules, institutions and practices shaping 
contemporary governance of land at the global-scale. The focus herein is on international/public 
modes of global governance since much of the new global rule-making projects are primarily taking 
place in traditional international organizations such as the FAO. However, the role of non-
state/private modes global governance relevant to land, and their overlap with international/public 
ones, is acknowledged as important but is treated elsewhere in this collection (see Gentry et al. 
2013; Borras et al 2013c; Auld 2013). At the same time it is important to note that the distinction 
between international/public and transnational/private is ever more blurred with global civil society 
and private actors ever more engaged in policymaking at traditional intergovernmental bodies such 
as the UN Committee on World Food Security, even though formal decision-making remains the 
exclusive prerogative of nation-states.i The chapter is organized as follows. The first section 
situates the rising interest in land governance and demand for global-scale forms of land regulati
as a response to the contemporary phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’. The second section elaborates 
on the concept of emergent global land governance in reference to contemporary debates about 
global. The third section identifies key institutional elements of emerging global land governance
through a comparison of governance instruments across the fields of investment, food and 
agriculture, and forestry and discusses the key trends in this governance field. The last section 
concludes with a discussion of the longer-term policy and political challenges in emergent global 
la
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Land governance is by no means a new area of policy debate and the challenges of land governanc
are part of the everyday politics in many jurisdictions, for example, such as land redistribution to 
landless peasants in Brazil or reclassifying farmland for conservation purposes in the United States. 
Since 2008 there has been heightened interest in land and its governance because of a massive wa
of ‘land grabbing’ worldwide. Contemporary land grabbing has significantly altered the politica
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‘Land Grabbing’ As Context 
The recent wave of land grabbing has galvanized international attention and energy to the i
land governance in an unprecedented manner. The land grabbing phenomenon first came t
attention in the summer of 2008 following a report by the Spain-based NGO GRAIN that 
documented a sharp increase in the sale or lease of very large units of agricultural land in 
developing countries by foreign investors and governments (GRAIN 2008). Subsequent res
academics and international organizations has confirmed land grabbing as an extensive 
p
Deininger et al, 2011; Anseeuw et al. 2012a:2012b; Oxfam 2012; Cotula 2011:2012).  
 
Six key characteristic are briefly highlighted to contextualize the unique features of contemporary 
land grabbing and why land grabbing has become such a prominent issue of global concern. First, 
the global land grab is a recent phenomenon. It is well established that land grabbing proliferate
during and after the 2008 ‘triple’ food-fuel-financial crisis. Whereas some land grabbing was taking
place prior to the 2008 crises, this was relatively marginal, and the trend line spiked sharply in 
2008. Table 1 (see below) provides an illustration of this trend drawing on recent data reported by 
the Land Matrix Project that is the best available source at present.ii The unique timing of the sh
rise in land grabbing supports numerous theories that regard contemporary land grabbing as driven
by the attractiveness of rising returns in the agricultural sector and in farmland values, growin
international demand for biofuels, and strategies for securing agricultural supplies by nations and 
corporations (Cotula et al. 2009; World Bank 2009; Borras et al. 2010). Second, the scale of 
contemporary land grabs has been of a significant magnitude. Estimates range between 50 million
hectares (World Bank 2009) and 227 million hectares (Oxfam 2012) of farmland that has been 
grabbed. It is generally acknowledged that complete data remains patchy due both to the lack 
transparency of most land deals, the lack of agreed upon methods (Cotula 2012), and the politics o
numbers at play in global policy debates given the centrality
id
data, all the estimates clearly point to a substantial figure.  
 
Table  
Year Hectares Num
2006 450,640 43 
2007 1,123,275 29 
2008 1,723,457 36 
2009 1,879,108 39 
2010 1,303,609 23 
2011  422,200 3 
Unaccounted 44,234,183 738 
 Source: Land Matrix (http://landportal.info/landmatrix/get-the-detail/by-year) 
 
Third, land grabbing is occurring in all regions of the world make it a global-scale phenomena. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is certainly a hot spot for land grabs but recent research has also shown 
intensifying land grabbing activity in Asia (Hall 2011), Eastern Europe (Visser and Spoor 201
the Americas (Borras et al. 2013b) and Oceania (Filer 2012). There is growing evidence of land 
grabbing expanding into the North with Australia so far a major site of foreign investment in 
farmland. Fourth, the source of investors in farmland is highly diverse and extends beyond a
traditionally engaged in agriculture, including states (including sovereign wealth funds) and a rang
of private sector actors (e.g., agri-food corporations, commodities traders, and institutional 
investors) located in the North and Global South (Margulis and Porter 2013; Daniel 2012). Fifth, 
the available data suggests that a significant proportion of land grabbing has been to produce ‘
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ature of contemporary land grabbing as is the prominence of ‘land grabbed land grabbers’ such as 
razil (Borras et al 2013b; Rulli et al 2012). 
crops and commodities’ (Borras, Franco and Wang, 2013; Anseeuw et al. 2012b: xi) such as palm, 
soy and sugar that are important to the expanding global biofuel complex. This suggests that 
demand for biofuels, and the policies stimulating their greater use in transport fuels, have turned o
to be much more significant drivers of land grabbing than initially projected when land grabbin
was largely predicted to be for the outsourcing of food (Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen 2010). 
Sixth, land grabbing is associated with the interaction among land and new and diverse sets of 
technologies – such as new seeds and genetic materials and high-tech production technolog
automated mega-farms controlled by distal headquarters); new financial products such ‘land fund
enabled through digitized trading and speculation in financial markets; and new means of 
‘discovering’, measuring and mapping land with geographical information’s systems (GIS)
example, GIS make
d
physically on site.  
 
Land grabbing is one of many terms that refers to the large-scale acquisitions of land for the 
purpose of outsourcing of agricultural production. There is no consensus definition and therefore 
significant scholarly (and real world political) debate about what is and is not land grabbing (see 
Margulis, McKeon and Borras 2013). R
s
of control grabbing that is defined as: 
 
“[T]he capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of land and other natural resources through a variety of mechan
nd forms involving large-scale capital that often shifts resource use to that of extractiona
d
mitigation imperatives and demands for resources from newer hubs of global capital.”   
 
This is an analytically useful definition of land grabbing because it is does not overemphasize th
quantitative dimension of land grabbing (however, scale and measurement remain important). This 
definition provides a framework that captures the potential diversity of localized forms of land 
grabbing, such as ‘green grabs’ (Fairhead et al. 2012), ‘water grabs’ (Metha et al. 2012; Allan 
2012) and other forms of the ‘foreignization’ of space (Zoomers 2010). In addition, the idea
control grabbing captures that contemporary land grabbing is driven by changes in the global 
political economy, including the decision by distal age
im
Sassen (2013) argues is a nascent global land market. 
 
Contemporary land grabbing echoes the great land rush during the era of imperialism and 
colonialism. In turn, this had prompted a scholarly debate the similarities and differences bet
land grabbing today and in the past (Alden-Wily 2012; Ayers 2013). Depending on the theoretical 
framework and time-scale used, scholars draw different conclusions on what is novel about 
contemporary land grabbing and to what extent is a continuation of historical patterns of capitali
world development. Post-colonial and imperial frameworks are useful because they shed light on
how past (and contemporary) asymmetries in power among agents and local populations shap
societal conditions, which in turn drive land use decisions. Yet the six characteristics discussed 
above highlight the importance of factors that do not fit well with neo-imperial and -colonial 
frameworks because land grabs today differ in two key respects. First, contemporary land grabbing 
involve a much more diverse set of actors, institutions and governance practices that did not exist 
during the era of colonialism and imperialism (Margulis and Porter 2013). Second, many land grabs 
do match well earlier patterns of core-periphe
fe
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Demand for Global Land Governance 
Demand for global governance of land in response to the speed, scale and extensiveness of land 
grabbing can be argued to be driven by two categories of concerns. For the purpose of the analysis
here these two categories are treated as ideal types. These two categories of concerns are importa
because they serve as the organizing frameworks for much of the transnational advocacy on 
grabbing that h
la
governance. iii 
 
The first category fall under the label of exclusion and this refers to situations where communitie
and individuals are displaced by land grabs. Exclusion can occur in legal, peaceful and volunta
ways but also in illegal, violent and coercive ways. This concern is principally an ethical/social 
justice framing. The principal problem here is that certain communities – small scale farmers, 
agricultural workers, indigenous peoples, and other vulnerable and marginalized peoples – are mo
likely experience a loss of livelihoods, violence, and be excluded from socially and economically 
valuable lands and resources. The actual forms of exclusion will very significantly given factors 
such as population density, the type of land tenure arrangements in place, the type of ag
practices, and the crop in question, and so on. But the basic point is that most people who continue 
to live on the land 
o
personal survival. 
 
The most visible expression of concerns over exclusion has come from global civil society, 
including the 2011 “Stop the Land Grab” campaign led by the transnational peasant move
Via Campesina, which has emphasized the importance of international public regulation and 
proposed an international moratorium on land grabbing and to make states and investors 
accountable. In 2012, well known INGOs such as Oxfam and ActionAid called for a moratorium on
land grabs in Africa. Oxfam, for example, has made land grabs a key theme of their new high 
profile international agriculture and food focused campaign, GROW calling for international good
governance standards for land deals to prevent the displacement and further impoverishment of 
vulnerable people. Global campaigns organized around the idea of exclusion prioritize protecting 
th
bringing such cases to the attention of global publics and international bodies (Graham et al. 2010)
 
There is a related geopolitical and geoeconomic concern that falls under the exclusion label. T
concern emphasizes the potential for escalating social conflict and economic risk arising from 
tensions between locals and land grabbers (e.g., access to land and resources, effects on land 
prices), citizens and their governments (e.g., political contestation over land deals, corruption and 
legitimacy of ‘complicit’ governments, food insecurity), and among states contesting the legitimac
of land deals and their effects on commodity markets. Geopolitical and geoeconomic concerns 
loomed larger at inter-state forums, such as the Group of Eight (G-8) summit in L’Aquila and the
UN wh
e
there.  
 
The second set of concerns fall under the label of ecological risk. This refers to concerns about the 
potential negative environmental consequences of land grabs. Such effects can occur in a myriad o
ways such as environmental damage caused by the intensification of extractive forms of production 
or the loss of biodiversity and traditional knowledge when industrial mono-cropping for biofue
supplants more traditional forms of agriculture. It is only recently that agriculture has figured more 
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int, land grabbing of farmland is at odds with the scientific consensus on the need 
 shift towards low-carbon forms of agriculture and sustainable intensification (see Fen and 
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ls’ policy that 
id and abets’ land grabbing. These concerns are also evident in the manner in which agriculture 
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 of telecoupled systems 
dvances and is translated to policy actors, and with repeated interaction among actors engaged in 
rticulating these concerns in global policy spaces becomes more frequent. 
seriously in climate change science even though it has long been well known that agricultural 
production is the single largest use for land (Turner et al. 2007). A recent study by the Washingt
based International Food Policy Research Institute (Nelson et al. 2010) calculates that agricultural 
emissions account for almost one-third of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions globally, a number 
significantly greater than estimates just a few short years ago and which is more than the energy and
transport sectors combined. The available data suggests that much land grabbing has been for the 
industrial production of agriculture commodities for global biofuel and meat production (Anseeuw 
et al. 2012a), both of which are carb
e
modes of agricultural production.  
 
There teleconnected driven ecological tensions in the case of land grabbing when policies inte
to promote positive environmental outcomes in one jurisdiction can have negative environmenta
effects in another. The most well-known is the case of corn and palm-based biofuels that is a 
significant driver of land grabbing and has spatially dispersed social and environmental effects 
when ‘green energy’ is produced in country but consumed in another (Wicke 2013; van der Horst 
and Vermeylen 2011). Another significant concern of ecological risk is that land grabbing may 
exacerbate the vicious cycle tension of carbon-intensive agricultural practices and degradation of 
ecological resilience in light off the general vulnerability of agriculture yields to climatic chan
From this standpo
to
Ramirez 2012).  
 
Ecological risk concerns are evident in the work of major INGOs, including Action Aid’s cam
on land grabbing that calls for reform of the EU’s biofuel policy, Friend of the Earth Internationa
(FOEI) critiquing the World Bank’s involvement in supporting land grabs to set up oil palm 
plantations in Uganda, and Green Peace’s 2011 blockade of land grab-related timber exports in 
Papua New Guinea. In general, these campaigns have sought to frame land grabs as a threat to 
sustainable development. The work of the FOEI, for example, has also attempted to highlight the 
World Bank’s facilitating of land grabs and in turn called for reform of the multilatera
‘a
has taken on greater importance in the international climate change talks since 2009. 
 
In reality concerns about exclusion and ecological risk overlap considerably. However in the 
everyday real world debates about global land governance the two categories remain disconnected. 
The International Land Coalition’s Madiado Niasse (2011, p.1) argues the debates about land 
governance “is typically ignorant of and disconnected from the discourse on the physical condition 
of the land, despite the fact that the latter affects the productive capacity of the land”. Similarly, the 
land use science has disconnected land from its socio-economic relations. Bridging this divide 
objective of this volume (see Seto and Reenberg 2013) and the concept of telecoupled systems (Li
and Hull 2013) is helpful in this regard by providing a conceptual framework and language to 
describe what are highly complex human-land interactions. However, the disconnection between 
concerns about exclusion and ecological risks in everyday politics are not only a result of a lack of 
knowledge or communication. Many political actors are aware of these linkages, however, many 
within the exclusion camp must strategically engage with dealing with human indignities in th
and now. Ecological risks, and land use science, operates on much longer time horizons that can
easily always be framed into immediate political action. But going forward the prospects for 
bridging the disconnect between concerns about exclusion and ecological risk in contemporary 
global land governance debates are likely to improve as both the knowledge
a
a
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Emergent Global Land Governance 
 
Rising concerns about land grabbing and actions to address these are producing emergent glob
land governance. To date, the issues of land tenure and investment have appeared to gain the most 
traction. This development is captured by two recent global governance instruments: the UN
Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Governance of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security and; ongoing negotiations for principles on responsible agriculture 
investment. These instrum
e
global land governance. 
 
Before plunging headlong into the analysis of the constituent parts of emerge
g
concept of global gov
 
Global Governance 
Global governance is term that is widely used to refer to the modern practice of governing 
transborder problems and to the institutions, rules, and actors that govern the global political 
economy. Global governance as an academic concept and field emerged in the 1990s in response t
new global-scale problems such as HIV/AIDs, climate change and migration that were beyond 
capacity of any single nation-states to manage on their own (Roseneau 1995). The field of global 
governance was also deeply influenced by shifting power at the global level such as the fall of 
Soviet Union and what this meant for US unipolarity and multilateralism. More recent work has 
focused on emerging countries as new powers in multilateralism. In addition to this state-centric 
work, other research into power in global governa
a
and influence in global governance institutions.  
 
Several concepts from global governance scholarship are relevant for the study of land as a 
governance issue. The first is the concept of authority that is closely related to the idea of 
governance; which actors have authority to regulate a particular sphere of activity? Global 
governance scholarship has shown that authority has flowed into two principles ways over the past 
decades in ways that differ from the immediate post-war era; a shift of authority from the state to
international institutions that have the capacity to constrain state sovereignty (e.g., European Unio
(EU), World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Criminal Court (ICC)), and a shift of 
authority to non-state actors that have taken on governance functions in existing policy fields but 
also in new areas of activity. The latter includes private actors, for example, such as credit rating 
agencies that have a significant influence on the state’s financial affairs to industry associations t
create standards for self-regulation to private international arbitration of financial and investment 
deals (Cutler et al 1999). This also includes global civil society organizations (Smith 2007), for 
example, engaged in fair trade labeling and certification or developing standards for humanita
assistance. These developments als
pr
traditional inter-state bargaining.  
  
Scholars have described the present state of global governance as thick and dense because of the 
proliferation of public and private global governance instruments (Raustalia and Victor 2004).
increasing density of global governance is important in two ways. First, it points to a significan
change in the ‘architecture” of global governance. Much of the post-war system international 
governance was founded on narrowly focused instruments to address what were perceived a
discrete issue areas such as security, finance and trade. Global governance today looks somewhat
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 and practices (mostly at the global level) suggest that land will less likely be 
 coherent, singular issue area. Instead, aspects of land governance appear to cut across various 
cales and issue areas. 
e 
es, 
tion 
different; issue areas are no longer governed by singular instruments but often by multiple, 
overlapping instruments. Take, for example, intellectual property rights that are governed by the 
1994 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) under the WTO 
and various standards negotiated by states at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 
This trend towards greater plurality of instruments in global governance is partially explained by 
greater awareness of, and acceptance by, policymakers and other policy actors that most governance
challenges are multidimensional and complex and that these require accordingly more extens
and flexible forms of governance. This is evident in various fields, such as efforts to fill the gaps in 
governance when it comes to trade and the environment or security and migration. Multiple 
instruments that cut across issues area also arise when states and non-state actors engage in strat
and tactical approaches to global governance that assemble existing and new instruments into 
configurations (Young 2002; Raustalia and Victor 2004). The motives for this can vary highly, 
ranging from a 
re
weaker actors. 
 
Land as a Global Governance Issue 
Land has not traditionally been understood as a global-scale “problem” like other fields of globa
governance such as climate change, HIV/AIDs, and terrorism. There are several intellectual and 
political reasons for this state of affairs. The foundations of the present international system are 
premised on the territorial sovereignty of the nation state and of which land control is a defining
feature; this is affirmed by practices such as international legal recognition of state borders a
authority of nation-states to govern as they wish within their demarcated territory. In addition, 
politics and ideological strugg
in
McKeon and Borras 2013).  
 
The current situation is distinct – states and non-state actors treat land as a global issue that requ
global-scale forms of governance. This is primarily the case because today policymakers understand
that land is teleconnected and telecoupled. Ever greater transborder flows of ideas, capital, and 
technology, and transboundary challenges such as climate change, are driving substantive shifts in 
land use change and the distribution and access to the bundle of resources (soil, water, genetic 
material and sub-soil minerals, etc.) that constitute ‘land’ for those who live directly and indirec
off the land. However, land as sovereign territory and as a commodity are two powerful paradigms 
highly visible in these new global politics. Yet these are not the only land-related paradigms of 
importance. The discourse on the use of land for environmental services under the climate change 
regime has gained significant traction although its presence in new international rules is yet t
codified it remains problematic (Norgaard 2010). We also see an unfolding struggle to cre
international rights such as the right of indigenous people and peasants to land (Jones 2011; 
Xanthaki 2010). The multidimensionality of land and the increasing plurality of relevant 
governance institutions
a
s
 
 
Constituent Elements of Emergent Global Land Governance 
This section provides an initial mapping of the constituent elements of the current embryonic stag
of global land governance. Three constituent elements are selected – investment, land tenure and 
forestry – because they are specific to global land governance or highly relevant to it. Of course 
many other relevant instruments exist related to conservation (i.e., payment for ecosystem servic
transfronteir conservation areas, etc.), Convention No. 169 of the International Labor Organiza
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 rights of indigenous and tribal peoples, and so on but these are not addressed here. 
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 PRAI citing it had been developed without sufficient consultation and 
articipation. As a result, in late 2012 states agreed to reopen the negotiation on responsible 
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or multi-donor agriculture and food trust fund, the G8 recently established the $US 
 billion ‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, and the Gates Foundation and other 
nd 
of 
e 
and ‘weak’ governance in host states are a consideration in land grabbing but by no means the most 
(ILO) on the
Indeed, the three elements discussed below are illustrative and not meant be comprehensive.  
 
Investment 
Foreign investment by states, transnational corporations, institutional investors, and domestic elites
in land has been the principal mode of land acquisition during the contemporary land grab
In
local communities whose land is sold or leased to the risks for investors active in states with w
regulatory regimes and where land deals may be revoked if the political climate changes. 
 
Investment in land for agriculture is a sphere of activity that has elicited the creation of a new 
global governance framework for land. In 2009, the G-8 agreed to “work with partner countries and 
international organizations to develop a joint proposal on principles and best practices for
international agricultural investment”.iv The first development was the consultations for the so-
called Principles on Responsible Agriculture Investment (PRAI) that was led by the World Bank i
partnership with FAO, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). A first draft of the principles 
was presented in 2010 after initial expert consultation among international officials and exper v
The G-8 and G-20 have repeatedly affirmed their support for the PRAI, most recently at the 2
Camp David and Los Cabos summits. However, many developed countries and global civil society 
refused to endorse the
p
agricultural investment at the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS). This process is
completed by 2014.  
 
From the onset, the idea of responsible agriculture investment has been to establish a set of 
standards for private, foreign investment in agriculture that would encourage investment in that 
sector and minimize negative social consequences. General objectives include standards for f
prior and informed consent prior to the transfer of land, fair compensation of existing land users, 
and maximizing economic opportunities and protecting food security for local communities.  T
authors of the PRAI built upon various international standards and best practices relevant to 
investment in agriculture (and investment more generally) but that is tailored specifically to address
the concerns associated with contemporary land grabs with an emphasis on transparency and 
sustainability. An international code of conduct for investors is seen by global policymakers as 
critical to maintaining the political consensus on increasing investment in developing countrie
agriculture (Margulis and Porter 2013). For example, the G-8 and G-20 combined have pledged 
$US 20 billion f
3
philanthropic actors have donated hundreds of millions to support agriculture production in the 
Global South.  
 
The effectiveness of responsible agricultural investment hangs on the assumption that increasing 
transparency and establishing criteria for best practices will lessen investment-related risks a
increase the benefits of private investment in agriculture. This assumption draws on the success 
other sectorial initiatives but especially the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) of 
which the World Bank is a major supporter. However, there are serious questions about the 
applicability of the EITI to agriculture because the range of investors and producers is far more 
diverse than in extractive industries and land grabbing is highly variegated with respect to the rang
the commodity being produced (i.e., food, feed, biofuels and other industrial inputs), the methods of 
production, end use, and final market destinations. Another important consideration is that EITI is 
mainly concerned with corruption and monitoring payments by firms to governments. Corruption 
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xclusion and ecological risk that frame the current debate and drive demands for global land 
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work to enhance the tenure and access to land 
nd productive resources by poor rural households. Livelihoods and preventing political, social and 
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k 
 
 
irst 
s 
y parties to the negotiation were not 
omfortable with the term land grabbing viewed by some as ‘too political’ and others too vague for 
 
 
s 
important policy issue identified by actors. Therefore, it is not clear that the emphasis on corru
built into the E
e
governance.  
 
The politics of responsible investment in agriculture are highly contentious. The legitimacy of
element of global land governance has been under a microscope because of the fact the initial 
principles were developed by international organizations with the support of G-8 instead of a 
universal body such as the UN and also because it was a top-down expert led exercise that had lit
direct participation by the private sector. Whereas much of global civil society was initially oppose
to the PRAI, the decision to restart negotiation on pri
s
devise new sta
 
Land Tenure 
The Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Governance of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security (from here in referred to as the ‘VGs’), which were ad
May 2012 at the FAO, is the instrument most associated in contemporary popular discourse and 
transnational advocacy with resect to global land governance. The VGs is a non-binding 
international document that provides a policy frame
a
economic exclusion looms large in this document.  
 
However, unlike responsible agricultural investment, international cooperation for creating the V
preceded contemporary concerns about land grabbing. The impetus for VGs can be traced b
the 2006 UN International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) 
during which states and global civil society organizations called for a global framework to 
implement enhanced land tenure at the national level. I
c
guidelines as a continuation of the ICARRD process.  
 
It is clear that contemporary concerns about land grabbing have significantly influenced the VG 
negotiations and its outcome. One can go as far as to claim they put the negotiations on a new trac
and changed actors’ perceptions of the importance of establishing the VGs. The official negotiation
process of the VGs took place during 2010 and 2011. By this point, land grabs were a prominent
issue and concerns about land grabbing appeared at the VG negotiations. The zero draft (i.e., f
draft of negotiated text) of the VGs contained several proposals specific to addressing concern
about investment and large-scale land acquisitions. States and global civil society actors that 
negotiated the VGs confirm that land grabs was the most contentious issue in the negotiation 
(Seufert 2013). The final version of the VGs does not make direct reference to land grabbing nut 
instead refers to large-scale transactions (FAO 2011; FAO 2012), which is understood to refer to 
land grabs but used in the official text on the count that man
c
the specificity required in an international legal document.  
 
The aim of the VGs, through its best practices-based approach, is to improve domestic governance 
of land tenure. This is logical given that land reform is an endemic, and often unresolved, political 
issue in many developing countries. Despite the emphasis on the national level there is much more
to the VGs. First, the VGs expand their scope to include not just the national governments of states
where land tenure issues are concerned; the guidelines also include provisions specific to private 
actors and transnational corporations, including obligations for the home states’ of these actors to 
prevent abuses of land tenure and human rights. In addition, the VGs spell out the responsibilitie
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N Human Rights Council that allows parties who have had their human rights violated to seek 
nal justice when national institutions are unable or unwilling to address such concerns).  
f 
nd/or 
 
 in the future. In addition, forest governance is ever 
ore relevant to land tenure issues now that the VGs explicitly apply to forests that in turn more 
 
bels 
), 
 Stewardship Council (FSC) have eclipsed international forest governance and 
rgued to rank higher in terms of quality and legitimacy than international/public forest governance 
NFF). 
Rio 
 
to 
ogging, 
st peoples’ issues. In addition the instrument established a framework for an 
ternational forest financing mechanism to support sustainable forest management and its 
for states involved directly (think China, Gulf States, etc.) in large-scale land acquisitions to ensure 
such investments are consistent with the protection of legitimate tenure rights, the promotio
food security and their existing obligations under national and international law (FAO 2012, p. 20).
The VGs have also created a political space for transnational forms of implementation and 
monitoring of land tenure practices. One option currently being discussed is creating a monito
mechanism under the auspice of the FAO’s Committee for World Food Security and includes the
participation of state and non-state actors. Such a mechanism, if achieved, would potentially 
strengthen land tenure by providing a forum for affected parties, especially marginal groups, to 
bring their concerns directly to the international community (similar to the special procedures of th
U
internatio
 
Forests 
The global governance of forests is highly relevant for emergent global land governance because o
the direct link between land grabbing for palm-based biofuels, land grabbing for pulp, timber a
bioenergy production inputs, and other ‘green grabs’ for conservation and carbon offset purposes. 
Up to now international forest governance has not figured prominently in the global land grab 
debate but is expected with new environmental governance instruments such as REDD+ argued to
be a potential important driver for land grabbing
m
closely links these two elements more closely.  
 
Unlike the more recent developments to establish global governance instruments for investment in 
agriculture and land tenure, the global governance of forests is far more established. Scholars 
continue to debate whether a singular international forest regime exists but agree that it consists of 
multiple public and private institutions and rules, many of which are only loosely interacting in a 
coordinated manner. An important feature of the global governance of forests is that it contains both
international/public and transnational/private instruments, the latter referred to under various la
such as private authority (Cutler et al. 1999), non-state market-driven governance (Cashore 2002
regulatory capitalism (Levi-Faur 2005), and liberal environmentalism (Bernstein 2000). Many 
forest governance schemes are in fact hybrid forms of governance that involve both public and 
private actors in policy design and implementation. Private and hybrids forms of forest governance, 
such as the Forest
a
(Cadman 2011).  
 
The two international/public institutions that are particularly relevant to emergent global land 
governance are the UN Statement of Forest Principles (UNSFP) and UN Forum on Forests (U
UNSFP is the non-binding international policy framework negotiated by states at the 1992 
Summit and is important because the principles established norms around forest governance, 
namely framing the challenge as deforestation and collapsing forest governance under the 
framework of sustainable development. vi The UNFF was established in 2000 and replaced several 
earlier inter-state forestry governance forums. It is an inter-state body that serves to promote 
international cooperation on sustainable forest management. Non-state stakeholders are consulted 
but only states formally participate in decision-making with respect the negotiation of declarations
and agreements. Although not a standard-setting body (Cadman 2011), the UN adopted in 2007 the 
Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forest, which is a set of voluntary guidelines 
enhance international cooperation on sustainable forest management, monitoring of illegal l
and action on fore
in
implementation. 
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anagement in the longer-term, there are significant academic and policy 
levant questions related to how such an approach translates to land grabbing beyond that directly 
lated to forests.  
als 
 
e 
 
 
g may be the contentious political issue today that is 
iving the debate to a considerable extent but this can change rapidly, for example, if there are 
ugh 
nt 
s 
ment, 
ybrid 
stic 
ing 
nd foster new policy challenges and global political contests. This includes political contests 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), and now REDD+, is one
recent approach to forest conservation that has gained widespread support from states, international
organizations and the private sector. REDD+, which is currently under negotiation, is seeking the 
creation for an international market for carbon credits. How REDD will be designed and governed 
remains, especially at the national level, remains unclear (Corbera and Schroeder 2011). Yet, if a
expected that REDD+ emerges a major pillar of the global environmental regime it may become an
important element of emergent global land governance. As REDD+ is unique in its approach of 
economic incentives as a means to control deforestation and sustainably manage forests it has the
potential to link together both exclusion considerations (i.e., livelihoods) and ecological risks (i.e., 
reducing GHGs emissions/preserving forest carbon stocks). However, it not yet known whether 
REDD+ will be successful given the low success rate of global environmental instruments re
their goals (Jabbour et al. 2012). Even if REDD+ is successful with respect to promoting global 
sustainable forest m
re
re
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Land governance is now a significant issue in world politics and the subject of new global rule-
making projects.  The VGs and ongoing negotiations on responsible agricultural investment sign
initial efforts to establish global land governance in response to land grabbing. It also clear that pre-
existing global governance instruments, such as those related to forestry (and potentially many
others), are highly relevant to this emergent global land governance. A central feature of emergent 
global land governance is that is applicability is not limited to any specific locality, region or 
country but are targeted worldwide and establish rights and obligations for actors inside and outsid
the State. In the same instance global land governance is in a state of flux. The constituent elements
may alter or expand over time. There is no reason to assume it will develop in a linear manner or
that path dependency is evident. Land grabbin
dr
major systemic economic or climatic shocks. 
  
Emergent global land governance is unlikely to exhibit the characteristics of a singular, self-
contained international regime. Instead, emergent global land governance has the characteristics 
associated with much of contemporary governance; land governance is likely to take place thro
several different types of global governance instruments that are loosely interlinked. This is evide
in the three instruments discussed in the preceding section that diverge across issue area (i.e., 
investment, land tenure, and forestry, respectively), their normative orientation and policy goal
(i.e., risk management, land tenure and access to resources, and sustainable forest manage
respectively), and the key policy actors involved (i.e., international organizations, agricultural 
ministries and transnational social movements, and forestry/natural resources ministries, 
respectively). The potential pool of other global governance instruments – public, private or h
– that may be relevant to global land governance is likely to be large given that land issues are 
highly multidimensional and cut across many different policy fields (e.g., gender, economic 
development, human rights, etc.). As such, emergent global land governance, as it develops, is 
likely to be a highly complex and congested domain. The congested and fragmented characteri
of emergent global land governance is significant because this is likely to exacerbate pre-exist
a
between and among states, international organization, private actors and global civil society.  
 
A major challenge posed the congested and fragmented characteristics of emergent global land 
governance is that there is no agreement about which set(s) of norms will provide the overarching 
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quired. So is greater dialogue among land use scientists and global governance scholars to better 
nderstand contemporary and future land use challenges and broad-based solutions to them.  
 members of Group 3: Decision Making, Governance and Institutions, 
igrid Quack, Billy Turner and participants of the Ernst Strüngmann Forum: Rethinking Global 
and Use in an Urban Era. 
Refere
 
Allan, J.A., M. Keulertz, S. Sojamo and J. Warner. 2012. Handbook of Land and Water Grabs in 
: 
ILC. 
Anseeu 2b. Transnational 
framework for global land governance. Such a situation can generate uncertainty for actors about 
which course of action is most appropriate and also amplify latent political tensions among act
Thus far, the most influential norms are those from the investment and land tenure fields. The
sets of norms do not hang together well because, in some but not all cases, increasing foreign 
investment in land may require the weakening of certain forms of land tenure rights such as 
collective/communal/customary rights. Whereas such tensions are most likely to be solved at 
national level on a case-by-case basis, global governance instruments matter precisely because they 
can inform decisions on the ground by providing actors reference to internationally accepted 
standards and legal precedents. In addition, global rules alter perceptions about the legitima
certain land grabbing practices that can have reputational risks for states and investors alike, for 
example, if land is acquired through massive dislocation of local people, this could lead to 
institutionalized practices of naming and shaming and other forms of international condemnation. 
As such, balancing competing sets of norms in global land governance may require further 
transnational policymaking and consensus across a highly diverse set of actors with very un
political and economic resources. This challenge becomes ever more difficult when other normative 
frameworks are added to the mix such as those found in global environmental governance. 
Sustainable development norms, such as those in global forest governance, and securing livelihood
do not always go neatly hand in hand. Conflicts between outsiders wishing to conserve resou
and destitute local populations that depend on the exploitation of resources for economic survival 
raises difficult ethical and social justice dilemmas that must now be increasingly negotiated 
transnationally and with highly uncertain outcomes for all parties involved. How such tensions
the need to balance competing interests in land use and its governance will shape the future course 
of global land governance. Therefore, more research on land governance at the global scale is
re
u
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i For example, this is evident in the formal participation of global civil society organizations and increasingly private 
sector actors in policy deliberations at the Committee for World Food Security. 
ii Obtaining reliable data on land grabs remain a significant challenge because of the lack of transparency. In order to 
provide an empirical basis for this argument Table 1 uses data obtained from the recent Land Matrix project as an 
indicator of land grabbing activity. Table 1 only displays verified land deals in a given year and it is important to note 
that the Land Matrix claims at least 44 million hectares of land grabs remain in the process of verification. 
iii These categories of concerns overlap with concerns about land grabs at the local and national level but play out 
differently in these contexts. 
iv Group of Eight (G-8), “Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future,” Declaration of the L'Aquila Summit, July 8, 
2009: 113(b). 
v The full text of the draft PRAI is available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/214574-
1111138388661/22453321/Principles_Extended.pdf. 
vi This normative orientation diverges significantly from other international instruments in forestry such as the 
International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) that initially sought to stabilize timber prices and supply through 
direct cooperation among major producers and consumers. 
